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Abstract
We propose a methodology for measuring the size and properties of the shadow economy. We use
a two-sector dynamic deterministic general equilibrium model with four different trends: hours
worked, investment-specific productivity, formal productivity, and shadow productivity. We find
that the shadow productivity trend is endogenous, in the sense that it is an exact function of
model parameters and the other three trends. We also document that, in order to be consistent
with observed (real-world) trend growths, the shadow sector needs to exhibit increasing returns
to scale, which is contrary to the standard procedure of imposing decreasing returns to this
sector. We apply our methodology to a set of seven Latin American and Asian countries and
document several empirical regularities that emerge from our analysis, the most important one
being that the volatility of shadow sector output is considerably larger than the one in formal
sector output.
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1 Introduction
This paper proposes a methodology for measuring the size and properties of the shadow economy
based on a dynamic deterministic general equilibrium (DGE) model. While other authors have used
DGE models as well, nearly all of them disregard the trend component found in most economic time
series. In our methodology, we exploit the dynamics of observed trends to account for both the size
and the cyclicality of the shadow economy, as they impose a set of equilibrium restrictions over the
growth rates of the model variables (including shadow sector output). Ignoring these restrictions—
or imposing ad-hoc growth rates to quantify the dynamics of the shadow economy—may produce
biased results.1
We show that explicitly incorporating the trends of the model variables into the analysis offers
a very different picture of the shadow economy relative to earlier studies. We start from a two-
sector model where the representative household has access to formal and shadow technologies; the
former uses physical capital and labor for production while the latter is labor-exclusive. We go one
step beyond by including trends on formal productivity, shadow productivity, investment-specific
technological progress, and hours worked.2
While the first three trends are considered standard in the literature, the last one deserves
some justification. Our main motivation is the fact that the number of hours worked (per capita),
especially in developing countries, has been increasing steadily over time. As an example, consider
the evolution of hours worked per capita for Brazil and Mexico (normalized to 100 in 1980), as
shown in Figure 1 below:
1 As an example, Elgin and O¨ztunalı (2012) calculate a biased estimate of the size of the shadow economy because
the imputed growth rates of the shadow economy do not follow equilibrium conditions. In particular, they assume that
the growth rate of the shadow sector productivity is the average of the growth rates of the formal sector productivity
and the capital stock. See Remark 4.2 for a discussion of this potential bias.
2 Our modeling strategy and choice of trends is inspired by the work of Lafourcade and de Wind (2012).
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Figure 1: Hours worked per capita, Brazil and Mexico, 1980-2014.
The index for Brazil hovers around a mean of 105, yet the one for Mexico has been increasing
throughout the sample. This growth can be accounted for by changes in the labor market (e.g.,
female workers entering the labor force) or the recurrent economic crises that have forced workers
to take additional jobs or pushed additional household members to enter the labor force (this is
commonplace in developing economies, where a social safety net is close to nonexistent). While
our methodology remains silent about the underlying cause of this steady increase, we believe that
omitting this trend can overlook relevant dynamics of the formal and shadow sectors.
We summarize our findings as follows. First, the model-imposed restrictions require the shadow
output trend to be an endogenous function of the exogenous trends (formal output, investment-
specific technological progress, and hours); hence, we can use real-world data to back out the
dynamics of the shadow sector. Second, we show that in order to be consistent with the remaining
trends, the shadow production technology necessarily exhibits increasing returns to scale. Third,
we apply our methodology to a set of Latin American and Asian countries and find that the
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evolution of the shadow sector responds to aggregate shocks in a way that is consistent with the
economic history of each country. Finally, we document that the volatility of shadow sector output
is considerably larger than the one in formal sector output.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief survey of the earlier
literature on measuring the size of the shadow economy. Section 3 presents the model economy in
detail while Section 4 shows how we deal with the model’s trends and lists the main results that
allow us to derive the size of the shadow economy. Section 6 provides the main time series and
their statistical properties, while Section 7 concludes.
2 Characterizing and measuring the shadow economy
The terminology regarding the shadow economy is often loosely used and exchanged for other con-
cepts that are not necessarily equivalent. In this section, we aim to provide a clear map between the
currently accepted notions and our working definition of the shadow economy. We also present and
discuss how other researchers have developed their estimates for the size of the shadow economy.3
2.1 Defining the shadow economy
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (see OECD 2002) uses the term
“non-observed economy” as a catch-all concept that stands in for the following categories of pro-
duction:
1. Underground production: goods and services that are kept off the market in order to avoid
taxes or regulations.
2. Illegal production: goods and services that are prohibited by law.
3 The material below borrows heavily from Solis-Garcia and Xie (2016).
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3. Informal sector production: goods and services that are produced by firms that are either
unregistered or below a threshold of employment.
4. Production of households for own-final use: goods and services produced within the household
for self-consumption.
5. Statistical underground: goods and services that should be accounted for but are not because
they are overlooked by statistical agencies.
In this paper, our concept of the shadow economy includes both the underground and informal
sector production; the remaining three categories are left out of our unit of analysis. (For example,
Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro 2010 rule out illegal production. The statistical underground
is hard to quantify and the production of households for own-final use includes a different set of
productive activities that are not meant to be traded in the market.)
2.2 Measurement of the shadow economy: early approaches
Measuring the size of the shadow economy is not easy. In their survey paper, Schneider and Enste
(2000) discuss three methodologies to calculate this value; here we examine them briefly and refer
to their paper for additional details.
Schneider and Enste use the term “direct approaches” to refer to (direct) surveys and samples
that attempt to quantify the number of productive entities that belong in the shadow economy.
However, these methods often provide biased estimates as respondents may lie about their for-
mal/shadow status. Also, the cost of implementing surveys of this kind makes it unlikely to be
used in a frequent basis and, therefore, to provide a consistent time series over a long period of
time.
The second methodology relies on macroeconomic indicators to infer the size of the shadow
economy over time—Schneider and Enste denote this broadly as “indirect approaches.” First, they
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consider the discrepancy between the expenditure and income measures in national accounts: since
these (by construction) need to be the same, any difference between expenditures and income values
of GDP could provide a measure of the shadow economy. Second, they look at the discrepancy
between the official and actual labor force: a fall in the participation rate could point to an active
shadow economy. The transactions approach conjectures a stable relation between the total volume
of transactions and GDP and uses this as a base to quantify the size of the shadow economy. The
currency demand approach assumes that all of the shadow economy transaction are carried out in
cash, so that an increase in shadow economy activity will result in an increase in the demand for
currency. Finally, the physical input method uses the (near unit) elasticity between electricity and
GDP as well as the growth of electricity consumption to infer the growth of the shadow economy.
In the “model approach,” the researcher uses econometric models to back out the size of the
shadow economy. The main idea behind this class of models is that the shadow economy does
not have a single cause and does not exhibit a single effect when it operates over time. Hence, an
econometric framework can be used to infer the size of the shadow sector by looking (simultaneously)
both at the hypothesized causes of the shadow economy (e.g., tax rates and regulation) as well as the
hypothesized effects (e.g., participation rates and currency demand). This methodology is called
the multiple-indicators multiple-causes model (MIMIC) and is the technique used by Schneider
et al. (2010) to derive the values that we use in this study. For comparison purposes, we include
their estimates when assessing the performance of our model.
2.3 Measurement of the shadow economy: general equilibrium
Besides the work of Schneider et al. (2010) mentioned above, we want to point to several contribu-
tions that are related to this paper as they make full use of general equilibrium models.4
4 Even though it is a full-fledged dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, we don’t include the work
of Gomis-Porqueras, Peralta-Alva, and Waller (2014) as it is built on top of a monetary search model; in this sense,
we believe it is closer in spirit to the currency demand approach than to the modeling strategy we follow below.
6
We first consider the work of Elgin and O¨ztunalı (2012). They use a DGE model (based on
the work of Ihrig and Moe 2004) to build time series of the size of the shadow economy for a
large panel—60 years and over 150 countries, compared to the 9 observations found in Schneider
et al. While their methodology uses dynamic methods (as we do), we find that their estimates are
potentially biased since the growth rates of the shadow economy are arbitrarily imposed and do
not follow the equilibrium conditions of the model (see Remark 4.2). Nonetheless, we also include
their estimates when assessing the performance of our model.
Orsi, Raggi, and Turino (2014) is perhaps the closest work to ours in terms of modeling approach.
They build a two-sector DSGE model to infer the size of the shadow economy as a latent variable,
while taking trend growth into account. That said, our paper is substantially different from theirs
given that they only use a deterministic labor-augmenting technological progress trend and that
the trend is the same in the formal and the underground economy.5 In our paper, we allow for
deterministic trends across different variables that differentiate the labor-augmenting technological
progress across the two sectors. By virtue of the different trends, we believe our model may better
capture the dynamics of the shadow economy. Though they use Bayesian methods to estimate their
model parameters and derive the size and properties of the shadow economy from the model’s own
forecasts, their focus is on Italy only. Our model is more flexible in terms of the data inputs required
to estimate our results, and below we test it for a set of Latin American and Asian countries.
3 Model
The model consists of a representative household-producer and a government; both agents are
described below. In what follows, uppercase letters denote trending variables while lowercase letters
denote stationary variables.
5 In this case, all the endogenous variables in the model grow at the same rate, which at least for the case of the
United States has not been supported by the data; see Whelan (2003).
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3.1 Household-producer
The household-producer chooses sequences of consumption Ct, hours worked Nt, and investment
Xt to maximize
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−σt
1− σ −
φΓHtN
1+χ
t
1 + χ
)
,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, σ ∈ R is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, φ > 0 is
a parameter quantifying the disutility of labor, χ ≥ 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, and ΓHt is a permanent shock that affects the household’s choice of hours. Maximization
is subject to a set of constraints: first, a law of motion for capital
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +Xt, (3.1)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate and Kt denotes the stock of physical capital. Second, a
household time constraint
Nt = NFt +NSt, (3.2)
where NFt denotes hours worked in the formal sector and NSt does so for the shadow sector. Finally,
a budget constraint
Ct + ΓAtXt = (1− τt)Kαt (ΓFtNFt)1−α + (1− ρsˆτt)(ΓStNSt)η, (3.3)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the capital income share in formal output and η > 0 is the labor share in shadow
output, ΓAt is a permanent shock to the production of investment goods, and τt ∈ (0, 1) is a tax on
formal sector output Kαt (ΓFtNFt)
1−α. We let (ΓStNSt)η denote shadow sector output; we assume
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that the government cannot tax shadow sector output unless it is exposed by a tax audit.6 In this
sense, ρ ∈ [0, 1) represents the probability of a tax audit and sˆ > 1 is a tax surcharge, as in Ihrig
and Moe (2004) and Orsi et al. (2014). Finally, formal and shadow production technologies are
subject to the permanent productivity shocks ΓFt and ΓSt.
3.2 Government
We include a government sector to account for the effect that tax rates have over the size of the
shadow sector (e.g., Ihrig and Moe 2004). We assume that the government uses tax revenue to
fund a stream of non-productive expenditure Gt and that it satisfies its period-by-period budget
constraint
Gt = τtK
α
t (ΓFtNFt)
1−α + ρsˆτt(ΓStNSt)η. (3.4)
Given equation (3.4), government expenditure is an endogenous variable in our model.
3.3 Exogenous processes
The set of permanent exogenous shocks is given by ΓHt, ΓAt, and ΓFt. (Proposition 4.1 shows that
ΓSt is an endogenous variable.) In particular, for i = {H,A, F, S},
git =
Γit
Γi,t−1
,
where git denotes the (gross) growth rate of variable i.
7
6 We can think of the representative household-producer as having access to a formal production function and a
“backyard technology” that produces the same good as the formal technology but with a lower productivity.
7 Conversely, Γit =
∏t
s=1 gis.
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3.4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium conditions of the model are given by8
Ct + ΓAtXt +Gt = K
α
t (ΓFtNFt)
1−α + (ΓStNSt)η (3.5)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +Xt (3.6)
Nt = NFt +NSt (3.7)
ΓAtC
−σ
t = αβC
−σ
t+1(1− τt+1)Kα−1t+1 (ΓF,t+1NF,t+1)1−α
+β(1− δ)ΓA,t+1C−σt+1 (3.8)
φΓHtN
χ
t = (1− α)C−σt (1− τt)Kαt Γ1−αFt N−αFt (3.9)
η(1− ρsˆτt)ΓηStNη−1St = (1− α)(1− τt)Kαt Γ1−αFt N−αFt (3.10)
Gt = τtK
α
t (ΓFtNFt)
1−α + ρsˆτt(ΓStNSt)η. (3.11)
We add expressions for formal, shadow, and total output
YFt = K
α
t (ΓFtNFt)
1−α (3.12)
YSt = (ΓStNSt)
η (3.13)
Yt = YFt + YSt, (3.14)
and derive an expression for the decentralized price of investment goods; from equation (3.8),
PXt = ΓAt. (3.15)
8 See the technical appendix for the derivation of these results.
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4 Dealing with the trends
The model includes trends in the household’s choice of hours worked (ΓHt ), the production of
investment goods (ΓAt ), and formal and shadow technology productivity (Γ
F
t and Γ
S
t ). Hence, we
need to find the relevant growth rates (as a function of the exogenous rates γHt , γ
A
t , and γ
F
t ) for
each of the model’s variables.
4.1 Deterministic growth rates
We use (3.5)-(3.15) to calculate the balanced growth path growth rates imposed by the model. (We
will use “equilibrium” and “balanced growth path” interchangeably. Also, growth rates without a
time subscript indicate equilibrium values.) From the aggregate resource constraint, law of motion
for capital, and household time constraint we get
gY = gC = gAgX = gG (4.1)
gK = gX (4.2)
gN = gNF = gNS . (4.3)
The inter- and intratemporal conditions require
gA = gYF g
−1
K (4.4)
gHg
χ
N = g
−σ
C gYF g
−1
NF
(4.5)
gYSg
−1
NS
= gYF g
−1
NF
, (4.6)
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where we set gτ = 1 in (4.4) since we assume tax rates are stationary. From the production side
gYF = g
α
K(gF gNF )
1−α (4.7)
gYS = (gSgNS )
η, (4.8)
and the final restrictions are
gY = gYF = gYS (4.9)
gPX = gA. (4.10)
We now present the following result (all proofs are contained in Appendix B):
Proposition 4.1
The equilibrium growth rates of the capital stock, gK ; (formal and shadow) hours worked, gN ;
(formal, shadow, and total) output, gY ; and the permanent shock to the shadow production function,
gS, are given by
gK = g
−1/(σ+χ)
H g
−[α(1−σ)+σ+χ]/[(1−α)(σ+χ)]
A g
(1+χ)/(σ+χ)
F (4.11)
gN = g
−1/(σ+χ)
H g
−α(1−σ)/[(1−α)(σ+χ)]
A g
(1−σ)/(σ+χ)
F (4.12)
gY = g
−1/(σ+χ)
H g
−α(1+χ)/[(1−α)(σ+χ)]
A g
(1+χ)/(σ+χ)
F (4.13)
gS = g
−(1+η)/[(σ+χ)η]
H g
−α[1+χ+(1−σ)η]/[(1−α)(σ+χ)η]
A g
[1+χ+(1−σ)η]/[(σ+χ)η]
F . (4.14)
Equation (4.14) is central to our paper: it ties the evolution of the shadow sector to the exoge-
nous growth rates of the model {gH , gA, gF } along the equilibrium path and helps us quantify the
size of the shadow economy over time.
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Remark 4.2. Equation (4.14) also shows why imposing ad-hoc growth rates for the shadow economy
can provide biased results. For example, Elgin and O¨ztunalı (2012) assume that shadow sector
productivity grows at the average of the growth rates of the formal sector productivity and the
capital stock. From (4.11) and (4.14), it’s clear that 12(gK + gF ) 6= gS .
4.2 Observable rates
Let {gˆK , gˆNF , gˆYF } denote the long-run averages of the (observed) growth rates of physical capital,
formal hours worked, and formal output. We now show how to link these real-world rates with the
exogenous rates {gH , gA, gF }.
Proposition 4.3
The map between the exogenous growth rates {gH , gA, gF } and the observed growth rates {gˆK , gˆNF , gˆYF }
is given by:
gH = gˆ
1−σ
YF
gˆ
−(1+χ)
NF
(4.15)
gA = gˆYF gˆ
−1
K (4.16)
gF =
(
gˆYF
gˆαK gˆ
1−α
NF
)1/(1−α)
. (4.17)
5 Parametrization
As we show below, we only require values for a subset of the deep parameters of the model, namely,
{α, σ, χ}; in addition, we use real-world data to calibrate the values of {ρ, sˆ, η}.
For the first set of parameters, we set the capital income share in formal output α to 1/3,
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ to 1, and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply χ to 1. All of these values are standard in the literature—but see the technical appendix
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for a sensitivity analysis over the values of σ and χ. Perhaps more controversially, we set the
probability of a tax audit ρ to zero; we offer some considerations in Remark 5.1. Do note that this
choice makes the tax surcharge rate sˆ irrelevant for the analysis below.
Remark 5.1 (Probability of a tax audit). Our choice of ρ = 0 may be puzzling to some readers.
After all, why introduce a parameter when we will make it irrelevant as we take the model to the
data? We do this not because we disregard the role of tax evasion, but from a purely empirical
perspective: it is difficult to find accurate values for the probability of tax audits in developed
economies, and more so in developing ones. That said, we perform a sensitivity analysis in the
technical appendix, where we combine our methodology with the estimates of Orsi et al. (2014) to
quantify the impact of our parametrization strategy with respect to ρ.9 We find that the results
with ρ > 0 are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to our benchmark specification, unless we
are willing to assume unrealistic values for this parameter.
In what follows, we explain how we calibrate the value of the shadow sector labor input param-
eter η. To start, we need the following assumption:10
Assumption 5.2. The observed (real-world) value of real GDP corresponds to formal output YFt.
To obtain the value of η, we first take the shadow-formal output ratio from Schneider et al.
(2010) for a base year t0; call this value Y[S/F ],t0 .
Remark 5.3 (Relevance of the shadow-formal output ratio in the base year). We are aware of the
criticisms that Gyomai and van de Ven (2014) make over the estimates of Schneider et al. (2010);
we decide to use the values calculated by Schneider et al. for three reasons. First, they are among
9 As a reference, Orsi et al. (2014) set sˆ = 1.3 and estimate ρ ∈ [0.015, 0.034].
10 Ferna´ndez and Meza (2015) also make this assumption in their study of the Mexican shadow employment.
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the most widely used estimates of the size of the shadow economy so it’s easy to compare our results
to theirs. Second, our methodology only requires the value of the shadow-formal output ratio for
a base year; this sets the level of the ratio but the dynamics are not connected to this particular
number. Finally, changing the value of the base year to any other value is straightforward.
By construction,
Y[S/F ],t0 =
YS,t0
YF,t0
. (5.1)
Given data for formal output, shadow output for t0 equals
YS,t0 = Y[S/F ],t0YF,t0 . (5.2)
Second, we use (5.1) again but now substitute the definition of YS,t0 in the numerator:
Y[S/F ],t0 =
(ΓS,t0NS,t0)
η
YF,t0
.
Solving for NS,t0 ,
NS,t0 =
(Y[S/F ],t0YF,t0)
1/η
ΓS,t0
. (5.3)
We can deduce the following result from equation (5.3).
Remark 5.4 (Increasing returns to scale in the shadow economy). In equation (5.3), the term inside
the parenthesis in the numerator is a fraction of formal output and is significantly larger than unity.
In order to obtain reasonable values for NSt it must be the case that η ≥ 1 (otherwise shadow labor
explodes); hence, in our methodology, the shadow sector necessarily exhibits increasing returns to
scale.
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Third, we take the intratemporal condition (3.10) and solve for η:
η =
(1− α)(1− τt0)YF,t0NS,t0
(1− ρsˆτt0)NF,t0YS,t0
.
Plugging from (5.2) and (5.3) and simplifying:11
η =
(1− α)(1− τt0)Y 1/ηF,t0Y
(1−η)/η
[S/F ],t0
(1− ρsˆτt0)NF,t0ΓS,t0
. (5.4)
Equation (5.4) is a nonlinear function of η, the (known) parameters {α, ρ, sˆ}, and real-world values
as ΓS,t0 is itself a function of η and observed trend values {ΓH,t0 ,ΓA,t0 ,ΓF,t0}. We use a fixed point
procedure to find the value of η such that (5.4) is satisfied. The algorithm behind the procedure is
described next.
Algorithm 5.5.
1. Obtain data for the capital stock, formal hours worked, and formal output {Kt, NFt, YFt}Tt=1;
use these to calculate the long-run growth rate averages {gˆKt , gˆNFt , gˆYFt}Tt=1 and the triple
{gHt, gAt, gFt}Tt=1 following (4.15)-(4.17).
2. Pick a base year t0 and fix values for {α, σ, χ, ρ, sˆ}. Pick a value M  0 and build a grid
with M elements over the interval [ηL, ηH ], where ηL ≥ 1 (see Remark 5.4); call this set N .
3. For every ηm ∈ N ,
(a) Calculate {ΓSt}Tt=1 following (4.14); without loss of generality set ΓS,t0 = 1.
(b) Calculate NS,t0 following (5.3).
11 From (3.4) and period-by-period government budget balance we get that
τt0 =
Gt0
Kαt0(ΓF,t0NF,t0)
1−α + ρsˆ(ΓS,t0NS,t0)η
=
Gt0
YF,t0 + ρsˆYS,t0
.
These terms can be easily backed out from real-world data (recall that Gt is endogenous in our model).
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(c) Calculate η following (5.4).
4. Find the entry in N where ‖ηm− η‖ is minimized. Set this value as the solution to (5.4) and
use it to re-calculate NS,t0 following (5.3).
5. Use {gˆNt}Tt=1 to back out {ΓNt}Tt=1 (see Footnote 7) and use this with NS,t0 to back out
{NSt}Tt=1.
6. Use {ΓNt, NSt}Tt=1 and η to back out {YSt}Tt=0. Use this series along {YFt}Tt=1 to calculate
{Y[S/F ],t}Tt=1.
6 Application: size of the shadow economy
To show the usefulness of our methodology, we first use it to infer the size and dynamics of the
shadow sector in Mexico. We also provide some historical context that links the behavior of the
time series to real-world events. We then present results for a set of Latin American (Argentina,
Brazil, and Venezuela) and Asian countries (Indonesia, Turkey, and Vietnam). We close the section
by presenting standard business cycle statistics that compare formal, shadow, and total output.
For comparison purposes, we include the series calculated by Schneider et al. (2010) and Elgin
and O¨ztunalı (2012). In what follows, we let the grid N have M = 1,000,000 elements (refer to
Algorithm 5.5) and pick 2007 as the base year in order to ease the comparison with the other two
series. (See Appendix A for a detailed description of the data used in the analysis.)
6.1 Mexico
Mexico makes an interesting case study for our methodology for several reasons. First, being a
developing country, the influence of the shadow economy matters a lot. Second, the recurrent
economic crises and the dismal economic growth experienced by the country since 1980 provide
17
a good opportunity to test the predictions of our methodology in the midst of a large economic
downturn. The evolution of the shadow-to-formal output ratio is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Mexico, shadow-to-formal output ratio, 1980-2014.
Our estimates show that the size of the shadow sector increased throughout Mexico’s “lost
decade” (1980-1990) and up to the aftermath of the Tequila crisis: between 1980 and 1997, the
average shadow sector size climbed from about 16 to 28%. The value remained stable until the
Great Recession, when it increased to a peak of 34%. Figure 2 also displays a sizable increase in
the shadow sector size after the major economic downturns in Mexico: 1983 (a large depreciation of
the Peso and banking sector nationalization; both happened in September 1982), 1995 (the Tequila
crisis, which started in December 1994), and 2009 (the Great Recession).
Figure 2 also compares our results to the estimates of Schneider et al.: they somewhat agree
with our calculations as they present a stationary shadow sector size (though it is slightly above
our estimates). Elgin and O¨ztunalı present a different picture for 1980-1997: their results show a
slowly declining shadow sector size that’s inconsistent with the economic crises of 1983 and 1995.
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Figure 3 aids in understanding the dynamics of the shadow-to-formal output ratio movements
by showing the evolution of both shadow and formal outputs; for both series, the value for 1980 is
normalized to 100. Note that the values for formal output come directly from the data while the
values for shadow output are generated by our methodology. We find that formal output was 30%
higher in 2014 relative to 1980, while shadow output was about 2.6 times larger. While the shadow
output series is considerably more volatile than its formal counterpart, Figure 3 is consistent with
a thriving shadow sector and a stagnant formal economy.
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Figure 3: Mexico, formal and shadow output, 1980=100.
6.2 Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela
We now show the results of applying our methodology to a set of Latin American countries.
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Argentina
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the Argentinean shadow sector output. Our results suggest that
the size of the shadow economy hovered around 17% from 1980 to 1994, when the influence of the
“Tequila crisis” shows up: the size of the shadow economy falls to a bit to 14% in 1996 and starts
increasing up to 1998. The recession of 1998-2002 has clear effects over the formal and shadow
economies. As shown in Figure 4, our methodology implies that the shadow economy falls from 18
to 11% of formal output in these years. The estimates of Schneider et al. are diametrically opposite
to our findings: according to their calculations, the shadow economy increased in size relative to
the formal output between 1998 through 2002, then the ratio drops considerably. This means that
shadow output increased far more than formal output, which is hard to believe in a recession of
the magnitude experienced in Argentina. On the other hand, the estimates of Elgin and O¨ztunalı
suggest a constant size of the shadow economy throughout the sample: the Tequila crisis and the
1998 recession didn’t have any effect over the size of the shadow economy.
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Figure 4: Argentina, shadow-to-formal output ratio, 1980-2014.
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Figure 5 shows the evolution of the formal and shadow output for Argentina. Both formal
and shadow output fall but the former does so less than the latter, which accounts for the fall in
the relative size of the shadow economy. The fall in the shadow-to-formal output ratio during the
recession of 1998-2002 follows the sizable contraction of the economy, as shown in Figure 5. Both
formal and shadow output decrease: for the formal sector, the fall is about 22% (relative to 1998);
for the shadow sector, the fall is nearly 51%. After the recession the Argentinean economy started
to catch up; our results suggest that the formal sector recovered quickly yet the shadow sector did
so at a faster rate.
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Figure 5: Argentina, formal and shadow output, 1980=100.
Brazil
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the shadow economy for Brazil. As is well known, Brazil experienced
an episode of stagnation in the 1980s: starting from a value of about 31% in 1980, the value increased
to 38% by the late 1980s. The ratio then fell by almost 10 percentage points in a short time: by
21
1998 the shadow economy represented a bit over 28% of formal output; this seems consistent with
the positive effects of the economic reforms of the early 1990s. Since then, there has been an upward
trend in the ratio and currently it is back to the same value as in the late 1980s, around 38%.
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Figure 6: Brazil, shadow-to-formal output ratio, 1980-2014.
The results from Schneider et al. are completely different from ours. Their estimates suggest
a falling trend from 1999 to 2007, opposite to our upward trend. Also, the results from Elgin
and O¨ztunalı do not capture Schneider et al.’s downward trend nor the large movements identified
by our methodology. In addition, we can better understand the behavior of the shadow economy
by inspecting Figure 7, which shows the evolution of the formal and shadow output for Brazil.
Consistent with the stagnation of the 1980s, the shadow economy grows faster than the formal
economy in the late 1980s and then begins to shrink, remaining relatively stable until throughout
the 1990s. Both the formal and shadow economies have grown since 2001 but the shadow economy
has done so at a faster rate.
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Figure 7: Brazil, formal and shadow output, 1980=100.
Venezuela
We now analyze the shadow and formal sector performance in Venezuela; see Figure 8. Our model
suggests that the shadow economy was relatively stable between 1980 and 2000, at around 21% of
formal output. The effect of the recession of 2001 can be seen in the figure, when the size of the
shadow sector falls marginally. As the recession ends, the shadow economy takes a larger role in the
Venezuelan economy, increasing nearly 15 percentage points in 5 years. The estimates of Schneider
et al. paint a very different picture: the shadow sector increases through 2001-3 and then it starts
to fall. Elgin and O¨ztunalı show a shadow economy that grows between 1980 and 2005 afterwards.
Neither series captures the sharp increase in shadow sector output that our methodology detects
between 2003 and 2008.
Figure 9 presents formal and shadow output over time. Formal output suffered from a series
of negative shocks starting from 1980—note that the index remains below 100 until 2007. The
shadow economy also takes a dive but manages to return to 100 by the early 1990s. The figure
23
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Figure 8: Venezuela, shadow-to-formal output ratio, 1980-2014.
shows that as the 2001-3 recession ends, both formal and shadow output recover, yet the recovery
of the shadow sector is far stronger than the one experienced by the formal sector. This suggests
that the economic policies taken by the government have affected the formal economy and that the
shadow sector is acting like an escape valve.
6.3 Asian countries: Indonesia, Turkey, and Vietnam
We now show the results of applying our methodology to a set of Asian countries.
Indonesia
The evolution of the shadow-to-formal output ratio for Indonesia is shown in Figure 10. After a
roughly 50% increase in the size of the shadow sector—jumping from about 9 to 15%—throughout
the 1980s, the ratio remained relatively constant up to 2006, increasing ever since. Note that the
estimates of Schneider et al. and Elgin and O¨ztunalı do not coincide with ours. The former show a
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Figure 9: Venezuela, formal and shadow output, 1980=100.
downward trend while the latter suggest a steep decline up to 1997 and a stable ratio afterwards.
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Figure 10: Indonesia, shadow-to-formal output ratio, 1980-2014.
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Figure 11 shows the paths of shadow and formal output. Both series have increased dramatically:
formal output is more than 3 times its size relative to 1980 while shadow output has had an almost
8-fold increase. The figure shows why our methodology predicts a counterintuitive decrease in the
shadow-to-formal output ratio during the Asian financial crisis of 1997: formal output declined
about 15% but shadow output fell by almost 21%.
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Figure 11: Indonesia, formal and shadow output, 1980=100.
Turkey
We show our estimates for the case of Turkey in Figure 12. Our results show a drastic decrease in
the size of the shadow economy (nearly 12 percentage points) from 1980 to 1988; the ratio remains
relatively stable at around 30% and jumps again in 2009 to levels comparable to those in the 1980s.
When comparing our results to those of Schneider et al., we see that both series share the downward
trend in shadow sector size observed between 1999 and 2007; this trend is also captured by Elgin
and O¨ztunalı yet their results are not consistent (both in trend and magnitude) for 1980-1995.
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Figure 12: Turkey, shadow-to-formal output ratio, 1980-2014.
We show the performance of formal and shadow output in Figure 13. Unlike the previous
examples, Turkish formal output outperforms shadow output throughout the sample.
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Figure 13: Turkey, formal and shadow output, 1980=100.
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Vietnam
Figure 14 presents the shadow-to-formal output ratio of Vietnam. Our results suggest that the
size of the shadow economy has remained small: it has increased from 8 to 16% of formal output
over the last 35 years (the ratio remained stable from 1985 to 2005). We also see that Schneider
et al. show a downward-trending ratio that is not too far off from our results; the estimates of Elgin
and O¨ztunalı suggest instead a dramatic decline in the ratio—a slow fall from 1980 to 1992 and
then a steep decline up to 2010.
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Figure 14: Vietnam, shadow-to-formal output ratio, 1980-2014.
The evolution of shadow and formal output in Vietnam is similar to that in Indonesia. Figure
15 shows a steady increase in the output of both sectors: formal output has increased by a factor
of 5 while shadow output has done so by a factor of 11.
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Figure 15: Vietnam, formal and shadow output, 1980=100.
6.4 Business cycle statistics
We now present some basic business cycle statistics for all the countries analyzed; in particular,
we document the volatilities of shadow, formal, and total output for our sample. We also present
some relevant values that are by-products of our methodology: the value for η, which quantifies
the returns to scale in the shadow production function; formal and shadow hours worked in 2007;
as well as formal and shadow output per capita for the same year.
We can point to three main features derived from Table 1. First, the standard deviation of the
shadow sector output is higher than that of formal sector output for all countries in our sample.
Second, the value of η averages 1.3, significantly above the constant returns to scale value of 1.
Finally, hours worked in the shadow sector are smaller than those worked in the formal sector,
though for some countries the difference is not that large (see Brazil).
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Table 1: Business cycle statistics and other relevant values.
Country SD(YS) SD(YF ) SD(YTOT) η NS NF YS YF
Mexico 0.0511 0.0220 0.0264 1.33 553 825 $4,553 $15,808
Argentina 0.0963 0.0368 0.0439 1.39 392 746 $3,911 $17,006
Brazil 0.0377 0.0202 0.0234 1.28 746 874 $4,829 $13,193
Venezuela 0.0681 0.0389 0.0438 1.39 524 719 $5,929 $19,188
Indonesia 0.0408 0.0233 0.0243 1.24 336 895 $1,337 $7,470
Turkey 0.0438 0.0275 0.0290 1.40 410 549 $4,666 $16,035
Vietnam 0.0327 0.0085 0.0093 1.09 328 1,223 $565 $3,923
Average 0.0529 0.0255 0.0286 1.30 470 833 $3,684 $13,232
7 Conclusion
This paper has developed a methodology to measure the size and properties of the shadow economy.
Our methodology is an improvement over other alternatives since (1) our procedure uses the re-
strictions imposed by a DGE model to estimate the size and dynamics of the shadow economy and
(2) it requires minimal data and is relatively easy to implement. We believe that our methodology
can prove useful to policymakers and academics interested in the shadow economy.
The work we present in the paper can easily be extended along several dimensions. First,
the length of the shadow economy size time series can be used to determine whether developing
economies are more volatile than developed ones, after taking the output of the shadow economy
into consideration (see Solis-Garcia and Xie 2016). Second, the data can also be used to elaborate on
the determinants of the shadow economy (e.g., Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobato´n
2000).
30
References
Ceyhun Elgin and Oguz O¨ztunalı. Shadow economies around the world: model based estimates.
Working Paper 2012/05, Bogˇazic¸i University, Department of Economics, 2012.
Robert Feenstra, Robert Inklaar, and Marcel Timmer. The next generation of the Penn World
Table. American Economic Review, 105(10):3150–82, 2015.
Andre´s Ferna´ndez and Felipe Meza. Informal employment and business cycles in emerging
economies: the case of Mexico. Review of Economic Dynamics, 18(2):381–405, 2015.
Eric Friedman, Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann, and Pablo Zoido-Lobato´n. Dodging the grabbing
hand: the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries. Journal of Public Economics, 76
(3):459–93, 2000.
Pedro Gomis-Porqueras, Adrian Peralta-Alva, and Christopher Waller. The shadow economy as an
equilibrium outcome. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 41:1–19, 2014.
Gyo¨rgy Gyomai and Peter van de Ven. The non-observed economy in the System of National
Accounts. Statistics Brief 18, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, June
2014.
Jane Ihrig and Karine Moe. Lurking in the shadows: the informal sector and government policy.
Journal of Development Economics, 73(2):541–77, 2004.
Pierre Lafourcade and Joris de Wind. Taking trends seriously in DSGE models: an application to
the Dutch economy. Working Paper 345, De Nederlandsche Bank, 2012.
OECD. Measuring the Non-Observed Economy: A Handbook. Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Paris, 2002.
31
Renzo Orsi, Davide Raggi, and Francesco Turino. Size, trend, and policy implications of the
underground economy. Review of Economic Dynamics, 17(3):417–36, 2014.
Friedrich Schneider and Dominik Enste. Shadow economies: size, causes, and consequences. Journal
of Economic Literature, 38(1):77–114, 2000.
Friedrich Schneider, Andreas Buehn, and Claudio Montenegro. Shadow economies all over the
world: new estimates for 162 countries from 1999 to 2007. Policy Research Working Paper 5356,
World Bank, 2010.
Mario Solis-Garcia and Yingtong Xie. Mismeasured GDP, business cycles, and the shadow economy.
Unpublished manuscript, 2016.
Karl Whelan. A two-sector approach to modeling U.S. NIPA data. Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking, 35(4):627–56, 2003.
32
A Data sources
From the Penn World Table 9.0 (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015) we obtain the following
variables:
1. Real GDP at constant 2011 national prices (rgdpna).
2. Capital stock at constant 2011 national prices (rkna).
3. Share of government consumption at current PPPs (csh_g).
4. Price level of capital formation (pl_i).
From The Conference Board12 we obtain the following variables:
5. Midyear population.
6. Total annual hours worked.
From the items above, our model variables are obtained as follows:
7. Formal GDP per capita: 1/5.
8. Capital stock per capita: 2/5.
9. Price of investment: 4.
10. Hours worked per capita: 6/5.
The shadow economy size (relative to formal RGDP) is obtained from Elgin and O¨ztunalı (2012) and
from Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010). The value of the tax rate follows the formulation
found in Footnote 11.
12 The source is The Conference Board Total Economy DatabaseTM, May 2016, http://www.conference-
board.org/data/economydatabase/.
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B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.1 First combine (4.1)-(4.10) to get the 4× 4 system
gY = gAgK (B.1)
gH(gN )
1+χ = g1−σY (B.2)
gY = g
α
Kg
1−α
F g
1−α
N (B.3)
gY = g
η
Sg
η
N . (B.4)
Substitute (B.1) in (B.2) and (B.3):
gHg
1+χ
N = g
1−σ
A g
1−σ
K (B.5)
gAg
1−α
K = g
1−α
F g
1−α
N . (B.6)
Now solve for gN from (B.6)
gN = g
1/(1−α)
A gKg
−1
F . (B.7)
and plug in (B.5). Solving for gK we get
gK = g
−1/(σ+χ)
H g
−[α(1−σ)+σ+χ]/[(1−α)(σ+χ)]
A g
(1+χ)/(σ+χ)
F , (B.8)
which is equation (4.11). Now use (B.8) in (B.7) and solve for gN to get
gN = g
−1/(σ+χ)
H g
−α(1−σ)/[(1−α)(σ+χ)]
A g
(1−σ)/(σ+χ)
F , (B.9)
34
which is equation (4.12). Next, use (B.8) in (B.1); collecting common terms yields
gY = g
−1/(σ+χ)
H g
−α(1+χ)/[(1−α)(σ+χ)]
A g
(1+χ)/(σ+χ)
F , (B.10)
which is equation (4.13). Finally, take (B.4) and substitute (B.9) and (B.10); after some algebra,
we find that
gS = g
−(1+η)/[(σ+χ)η]
H g
−α[1+χ+(1−σ)η]/[(1−α)(σ+χ)η]
A g
[1+χ+(1−σ)η]/[(σ+χ)η]
F ,
as needed.
Proof of Proposition 4.3 Take (B.2) and solve for gH to get (4.15). Take (B.1) and solve for
gA to get (4.16). Finally, take (B.3) and solve for gF to get (4.17).
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